CHAPTER TEN
Jus post Bellum
Justice in the Aftermath of War
“FOR AS LONG AS MEN AND WOMEN have talked about war, they have talked about it in terms of right and wrong.”1 With this simple but important observation Michael Walzer begins his modern classic on Just War theory, Just and Unjust Wars. There is, as he reminds us, a language of justification associated with war that has been as persistent and as important as the language of strategy. And out of the many efforts to justify war and the way it is fought have come the principles of the Just War tradition.
However irrational war may seem, particular wars always have their reasons. But society’s judgment of those reasons—the assessment of which are moral and which are not—has changed significantly over time. Consider the commands of Yahweh to the ancient Hebrews to take by force the territory of their neighbors and to annihilate the people they encountered in their wars of conquest.2 Or consider the thirteenth-century slaughter of those deemed heretics in southern France in the Albigensian Crusade that Pope Innocent III authorized.3 In both cases (and in many others that could be cited), genocidal wars were deemed not just moral but holy by those who embarked on them. Today, holy wars are no longer considered moral, at least outside of those groups that most of the world derides for being medieval in their outlook.
Just War theory may seem to be an island of stability in a tempestuous sea of moral reflection on war—the Golden Mean, perhaps, between pacifism and holy war—but it, too, has been subject to frequent and often quite significant change.4 From a certain perspective that change may appear to be part of a long, slow, steady evolution, but on closer inspection its evolution may bear more similarity to the punctuated equilibrium postulated by paleontologists Niles Eldredge and the late Stephen Jay Gould.5 The theory of punctuated equilibrium suggests that, in the natural world, the evolution of species occurs in fits and starts, proceeding rapidly at some points and slowly at others. External factors—changes in the climate, the appearance of new predators, or volcanic eruptions, for example—create the conditions for the rapid evolutionary changes that yield new species.
It is not an enormous leap from evolutionary biology to the history of ideas. Socially constructed understandings, of which the complex of justifications known collectively as Just War theory is one, also adapt to meet the challenges that altered circumstances may present. It should not surprise us if the adaptations occur more rapidly in periods of cataclysmic change than in more sedate eras. To take, as an example, only the particular variety of Just War theory developed within Christianity, we know that the conversion of Constantine following the Battle of Milvian Bridge (312 C.E.) and the subsequent Edict of Milan (313 C.E.), which changed the status of Christianity in the Roman Empire, were important prods toward the development of Augustine’s conception of Just War. Twelve centuries later, the often violent encounter of Europeans with the peoples of the New World led to a rethinking of certain fundamental principles of the Christian Just War tradition, particularly under the influence of religious thinkers such as Bartolomé de las Casas. It is worth noting, too, that Hugo Grotius’s enormously influential De Jure Belli ac Pacis appeared in the middle of the Thirty Years’ War.6
Just War theory, like ethical theory in general, develops where dilemmas are discerned. If the dominant culture perceives no problem with slavery, the subjection of women, or the rape of the environment, society is unlikely even to debate whether equality of persons or stewardship of nature are ethical imperatives. This, in fact, is one of the reasons that, until recently, little attention has been paid to the ethics of postwar settlements. Peace, after all, has not generally been problematized the way that war has been. A common assumption throughout history has been that the decision to go to war—a decision, that is, to set in motion the forces of death and destruction that accompany war—is one that imposes grave ethical responsibilities but that the decision to make peace—to stop the killing—makes no serious ethical demands. Consequently, Just War thinkers have elaborately theorized jus ad bellum without, until recently, giving much thought to jus post bellum. Thomas Hobbes famously compared war to stormy weather to make the point that there may be a proclivity to violence even when there is no actual fighting, but his meteorological metaphor can be put to a different purpose. Those who observe and ponder the ethics of war are like those who study the weather: storms excite great interest and diligent study, especially with respect to their causes. Not so with the calm that follows the storm, even if the causes of the next storm are to be found somewhere within it.
Although “just peace” has been a concern within the field of conflict resolution for many years,7 and some antecedents of contemporary thought on jus post bellum can be found in the writings of Aristotle, Augustine, and Thomas Aquinas, among others, the idea that the principles of just peace might be developed as an extension of the Just War tradition is relatively new. The most obvious spur toward the articulation of jus post bellum principles was the troubled American occupation of Iraq. What George W. Bush desired was a reconceptualization of jus ad bellum principles that would sanction his belief in the need for preemptive (or, more accurately, preventive) war. What he got instead was a renewed commitment among most Just War theorists to the traditional understanding of self-defense (and its limitations) combined with a new awareness that jus post bellum merited serious attention.
The fact that the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s brutal regime and George W. Bush’s “Mission Accomplished” declaration aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln merely signaled the beginning rather than the end of the difficulties the United States would face in Iraq led both strategists and ethicists to reconsider the transition from war to peace and its difficult intermediate phase, occupation. It was apparent to many people that as CIA director George Tenet later put it, “The war … went great, but peace was hell.”8 No one, however, should have been surprised to find that why and how the war was fought would have an impact on its aftermath. Although we have separate categories into which we can place prewar, wartime, and postwar moral considerations—jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and now just post bellum—it is in practice very difficult to pull on a single thread without unraveling the entire fabric of moral justification. This is well illustrated by one of the most widely debated of all wartime decisions, President Truman’s decision to drop two atomic bombs on Japan at the end of World War II.
The circumstances that influenced Truman’s deliberations are well known and can be recounted concisely.9 The U.S. entry into World War II was justified as an act of self-defense with respect to Japan (on account of the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor) and as an act of collective self-defense with respect to Germany. The two principal Axis powers were, with good reason, regarded as militaristic regimes bent on regional, if not global, hegemony. For this reason, the objective of the war for the United States and its allies was not simply the defeat of the aggressors but an occupation that would facilitate regime change as well. This objective strongly influenced the way the war was fought. Rather than fight a limited war in an effort simply to defend parts of Europe, North Africa, and the Far East from aggression, the Allies proclaimed the objective of unconditional surrender and adopted the tactics of total war, including the terror bombing of German and Japanese cities.
Within weeks after he became president upon the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt on April 12, 1945, Harry Truman was pressed by Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew to consider modifying the demand that Japan surrender unconditionally. Grew, a former ambassador to Japan, was joined in his lobbying effort by Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, and Admiral William Leahy.10 The ferocity of the fighting as American forces island-hopped across the Pacific toward the Japanese home islands and the quasi-religious fervor with which not only the Japanese military but civilians as well seemed willing to defend Emperor Hirohito had convinced these four and others in the American government that unconditional surrender might be achieved only at the cost of vast numbers of both American and Japanese lives. Truman, who had served as an artillery officer in World War I, was sympathetic to these concerns and cognizant of the desirability of avoiding a costly invasion. But he also felt the necessity of honoring the commitment that FDR and America’s allies had made to the aim of unconditional surrender as well as the sacrifices of tens of thousands of lives already toward that end. For weeks, Truman made no decision regarding a communication to the Japanese that would indicate U.S. willingness to permit the retention of the emperor following the Japanese surrender. In the end, Truman offered Japan this concession after Hiroshima and Nagasaki had been bombed. It was a decision that has given historians much fodder for debate, but what is noteworthy from the standpoint of Just War theory is the way American objectives framed at the beginning of the war with Japan affected decisions concerning the end of the war, including the portentous decision about how to bring the war to an end.
DEFINING AND DEFENDING JUS POST BELLUM
Jus post bellum—justice after war—is a set of principles to guide those making the transition from war to peace. Just as jus ad bellum principles exist to guide policymakers in the period before a war begins—posing questions about the ethics of resorting to war—and jus in bello principles exist to guide combatants in the conduct of war, so jus post bellum principles exist to offer moral guidance in the aftermath of war. Jus post bellum is not (or it should not be, at least) merely a list of directives concerning war crimes tribunals, reconstruction, peacekeeping, or even peacebuilding. If it is to be useful over the long term and consistent with the other parts of the Just War tradition, jus post bellum must offer principles akin to the last resort principle of jus ad bellum or the proportionality principle of jus in bello. It must provide moral principles to be weighed against other moral principles and strategic considerations rather than a list of rules and regulations.
Unfortunately, there is little consensus thus far even on how to approach the development of jus post bellum principles. Brian Orend, who has done as much as anyone to press the case for the inclusion of jus post bellum in Just War theory, has endeavored to articulate jus post bellum principles that closely follow in form those principles, such as right intention and discrimination, that are well established in the jus ad bellum and jus in bello parts of the Just War tradition. For example, in War and International Justice: A Kantian Approach, Orend includes among the principles of jus post bellum “just cause for termination,” right intention, “public declaration and legitimate authority,” discrimination, and proportionality, all of which are concepts generally found within standard lists of jus ad bellum and jus in bello principles.11 In some cases, however, Orend’s approach seems to be trying to fit a square peg into a round hole. Just as jus in bello requires a separate set of criteria from jus ad bellum, it is reasonable to suppose that jus post bellum will also require principles that are particular to the postwar context.
Before trying to find a set of norms that can gain widespread assent, it is important to determine what ends should be served by Just War theory in general and a conception of jus post bellum in particular. This, in turn, requires thinking about the foundations of the tradition.
Historically, Just War theory has been presented as an application of Christian dogma, natural law, Kantian ethics, and various other religious or philosophical positions. Today, however, it is best understood as a theory of human rights for wartime. In recognition of the dangers of an absolutist ethic—even one that emphasizes the protection of human life and dignity—Just War theory attempts to provide moral guidance for those situations when life and dignity can be protected only by war. It attempts to establish high barriers in order to limit the resort to war to those dilemmas that are truly solvable only by going to war. In fact, under modern international law, only self-defense, defense of others under a United Nations Security Council mandate, and humanitarian intervention appear to justify the resort to force in contravention of an otherwise absolute ban contained in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. It also attempts to limit the inevitable violations of human rights caused by the use of force by restricting killing to combatants and requiring that the harms of war be proportional to the cause for which the war is fought.
It is important to note that Just War theory is not the same as human rights. Fighting even a Just War (and fighting it justly) involves what would constitute terrible human rights abuses in peacetime. That war is different is apparent in the provision of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that permits states to derogate from many of their human rights obligations “in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation.”12 But, on the other hand, that the laws of war remain closely tied to human rights norms should be apparent from Common Article 3 in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, which defines for all armed conflicts certain minimum standards of humanitarian law, including prohibitions against “violence to life and person,” “cruel treatment and torture,” and “outrages upon personal dignity.”13
With this understanding of the relationship between Just War theory and human rights, jus post bellum can be regarded as a set of principles that facilitates the transition from war, in which human rights are restricted, to the more expansive peacetime human rights regime. This suggests that there are two basic states in international politics: war, in which human rights may be subordinated to the security of the state or the demands of an emerging responsibility to protect others, and peace, the normal condition in which the full range of human rights obligations exist.
Where does this leave us in our effort to formulate jus post bellum principles? It leaves us with a wide range of human rights obligations at the end of the transition from war to peace, but, unfortunately, it does not provide a simple checklist like the ones that jus ad bellum offers for judging the decision to go to war. There are, however, some conclusions in place of principles that can be offered.
From Aristotle to B. H. Liddell Hart and beyond, those who have seriously contemplated war have argued that peace is the proper objective of a just war.14 Although pronouncements about this purpose of war may call to mind Woodrow Wilson’s excessively hopeful description of World War I as “a war to end all wars,” there is clearly an important truth in the belief that, as Liddell Hart wrote, “the object in war is a better state of peace.”15
Until a lasting peace has been secured, there can be no restoration of human rights, which is the ultimate object of war. Setting aside the arguments regarding the justice of the U.S. rationale for the invasion of Iraq in 2003, serious jus post bellum concerns arose within months of the end of major combat operations primarily because of the obvious fact that the war had not, at least to that point, established anything close to a lasting peace within Iraq. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld argued that the violence occurring in Iraq after May 2003 represented the last gasps of a few “dead enders,”16 but he was quickly proved wrong. The insurgency that developed in Iraq rapidly surpassed the regular war in the number of casualties produced, both military and civilian.
After peace has been secured, the human rights of all parties to the conflict must be restored. If the war was precipitated by an act of aggression or the commission of serious human rights abuses, those who have been victims must have their rights vindicated. If there are trials to be held and punishments to be meted out, the rights of the accused must be respected. And if the destruction wrought by the war has imperiled the economic security of people on either side, the right to a minimum level of subsistence must be ensured. This is hardly a comprehensive list of the victor’s postwar requirements, but the basic idea is clear: when the fighting ends, the obligation to secure the human rights of all parties to the conflict begins.
However the obligations suggested by this rights-based theory are met, it is important that justice in the aftermath of war be given adequate attention. A well-developed and widely accepted concept of jus post bellum is important to correct both the complacency and the cynicism that often infect perceptions of what happens when a war has ended. Complacency is manifested in the common assumption that if the right side in a conflict prevails, justice will be assured. The victims of aggression and their defenders, it is thought, will inevitably be restrained in their treatment of their defeated foe; to do otherwise would be to forfeit the moral high ground that comes with standing up to an aggressor. And if, in victory, there is not perfect magnanimity displayed by those who were victims of aggression, this can be excused on the grounds that they are entitled to mete out punishment and seek reparations for the injuries they have suffered. The cynical view, on the other hand, is the one captured by Garry Wills’s observation that “only the winners decide what were war crimes.”17 It assumes that in the aftermath of war, as in all other aspects of international politics, power is what matters, and thus it makes little sense to try to subject postwar conditions to moral scrutiny. Both perceptions are wrong—and dangerous.
PROBING JUS POST BELLUM
There is, clearly, an argument for jus post bellum, but this should not preclude taking a critical look at the concept. The mere fact that no one across nearly two millennia of Just War thinking considered it necessary to articulate jus post bellum principles should give us pause. At the very least, it may require that we look to matters beyond the occupation of Iraq to explain why jus post bellum principles seem now to be filling a need that was not generally recognized by Just War theorists earlier. After all, the first wave of jus post bellum scholarship predated the invasion of Iraq in 2003.18
If there are deeper reasons for the turn toward jus post bellum than a poorly planned war in Iraq and its impact on Just War theory, they are likely to be found in the significant changes that have occurred in the nature of warfare and in the milieu within which wars are fought. Put simply, it is becoming more difficult to make peace even as more is being expected from peace settlements.
Two related changes in the international system that, although impossible to quantify, appear significant nonetheless are the development of the idea that justice is essential to the creation and sustenance of peace and the rise of a global humanitarian ethos, one that includes widespread acceptance of international human rights norms. The consequences of the punitive peace that followed World War I ensured that peace would be approached differently after World War II. The Allies were willing to assign guilt following World War II—in fact, it seemed imperative to do so given the atrocities that had occurred during the war—but they did so individually, and on the basis of judicial proceedings, rather than collectively and in summary fashion. Since then, the idea of war guilt clauses in peace agreements has become repugnant to most while postconflict tribunals and truth commissions have become more common as both the parties to conflict and the international community as a whole seek justice, whether retributive or restorative. These changes naturally demand that some attention be paid to the principles relevant to postwar justice, which is another way of saying jus post bellum principles.
The rise of international human rights and a global humanitarian ethos is not solely a post–World War II phenomenon—international humanitarian law dates back at least to the 1864 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field—but the emphasis of the United Nations Charter on human rights and, in the years immediately following World War II, the Nuremberg war crimes trials, the adoption of the Genocide Convention and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (both in 1948), and the formulation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions were decisive in moving the world in a new direction. This change in the international system, characterized by Ruti G. Teitel as a shift toward “the law of humanity,”19 has meant, among other things, that victors are now widely regarded as having obligations toward the vanquished, or at least toward the people of the losing side who may themselves be considered victims of war. The post–World War II experience looms large in this regard. If Germany and Japan could be spared general retribution and actually be rehabilitated after the war, then it must be that all have a right to decent postconflict treatment in the absence of personal responsibility for crimes. World War II established a model of sorts for postconflict justice, but it proved difficult to apply in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and elsewhere in the years following World War II. The global humanitarian ethos came without clear instructions for its implementation. The effort to develop jus post bellum principles has been one response.
There are a number of problems that confront the effort to articulate a useful framework for evaluating justice in the aftermath of war. Most are common to all aspects of the Just War tradition, but some are unique to jus post bellum.
As noted earlier, the division of the Just War tradition is based on the intuitive view that there are distinct phases in warfare. Simply put, there are separate before, during, and after phases that correspond to the Latin prepositions ad, in, and post. There have always been problems with this understanding. Many societies throughout history have been confronted with a state of war that precedes the onset of hostilities and sometimes follows their conclusion. This, in fact, is the condition that Thomas Hobbes compared to stormy weather in Leviathan. There are, arguably, even more ways that the lines between war and peace, whether of the prewar or postwar type, can be blurred today than there were in Hobbes’s day. The various forms of low-intensity conflict, as with sporadic military operations conducted by the Burmese military against ethnic minorities in Burma, blur the distinction, often deliberately, between peace and war. Rather than looking for certain characteristics of conflict that would allow for an “objective” determination of when peace passes into war and back again, contemporary theorists are more inclined to acknowledge that the categories are socially constructed and thus more subject to the vagaries of political discourse than to the more rigid categories of ethical and legal analysis. Thus a terrorist attack is an act of war—unless it’s not, in which case it may be a criminal act.
If acts of terrorism and the various possibilities for responding to them illustrate the difficulties in distinguishing peace from the onset of war, the Iraq and Afghanistan wars have become the principal exhibits illustrating the difficulties inherent in separating war from whatever follows it. In Iraq, regular military forces were routed and the government of Saddam Hussein was driven from Baghdad in a matter of weeks. But four years later, the United States was forced to initiate a “surge,” increasing the number of troops in Iraq in an effort to conclude a war that clearly had not ended with what had been described in May 2003 as “the end of major combat operations.” In Afghanistan, the removal of the Taliban regime within weeks of the war’s initiation in October 2001 has been followed by over a decade of counterinsurgency warfare aimed at establishing enough stability in Afghanistan to allow coalition forces to depart without ensuring a complete reversal of the war’s gains.
A second problem besetting the concept of jus post bellum, shared with other aspects of the Just War tradition, is its state-centric character. As articulated thus far, jus post bellum principles generally assume that the war being terminated is an interstate conflict in spite of the fact that, since World War II, the number of interstate wars has declined dramatically. At least ninety of the conflicts that have occurred since 1945 are classifiable as civil wars.20 Very few recent conflicts have been interstate in character, although the attention given to the U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq tends to obscure this fact.
Along with the rise of intrastate war comes the rise of nonstate actors as combatants. While most are rebel forces fighting civil wars, there are also terrorists fighting asymmetric wars. On the state side, private military contractors are playing a larger role than ever before, with impacts on Just War theory that are just beginning to be explored.
Efforts to develop a coherent account of jus post bellum confront a third problem that arises from the asymmetries that commonly exist at the end of a war. The rules that dictate whether it is just to go to war and those that specify how war ought to be fought are the same for all parties (or potential parties) in a conflict. (There is a significant exception if the validity of Michael Walzer’s concept of supreme emergency is granted.) The same, however, cannot be true for the rules that pertain to the postwar environment, at least not where the outcome has been decisive. The imbalance of power that exists between victor and vanquished at the end of a war necessitates that the two sides be held to different ethical standards, with most of the restraints that might be associated with jus post bellum being imposed on the victor. The victor, after all, is in the unique position of being able to punish war crimes, impose changes on the government or society, and set terms for reparations. For this reason, most efforts to date to formulate a list of principles underlying jus post bellum have focused on the victor’s duties even though this may mean the concept is incomplete.
THE WAY FORWARD
If jus post bellum represents a reasonable response to changes in the nature of warfare and the development of a new law of humanity—if, in other words, it is a worthwhile addition to Just War theory—then how are these problems to be overcome? A human rights foundation for jus post bellum principles is the key.
In a world where intrastate wars far outnumber interstate wars, it is important to base Just War principles on something other than a largely outmoded idea of absolute sovereignty. It may well be that nonstate actors should be discouraged in most circumstances from waging war; however, denying them any consideration in Just War theory or international humanitarian law is not the way to do so. Witness the global censure of U.S. treatment of enemy combatants in the so-called War on Terror. Respect for basic human rights, even in the case of terrorism suspects, is a better policy and one that could undergird a Just War theory for an age of intrastate war. It is also completely consistent with state sovereignty exercised in the interest of human security.
Because states have a right to derogate from most of their international human rights obligations when the existence of the state is threatened, and because intrastate war often poses an existential threat, international human rights law alone cannot ensure the protection of basic rights in time of war. Nor should we expect it to. Just War theory—and international humanitarian law—serve this purpose by offering human rights–based norms adapted to the circumstances of war.
Tying jus post bellum principles to human rights can also help Just War theory rationalize the asymmetry that arises at the end of war by acknowledging that power and authority are in fact morally relevant qualities in war as in peace. Human rights obligations generally fall on the state in its dealings with those who live under its authority. This is no different from the situation at the end of a war when most jus post bellum obligations fall on the winning side. All are enjoined to respect life and human dignity; not all are in a position to violate the injunction.
The problems that arise from the difficulty of separating the various phases of war are less easily addressed by an insistence on making human rights the foundation of Just War theory in general and jus post bellum in particular. Nevertheless, a rights-based conception of jus post bellum can generate a more positive blurring of lines by facilitating the transition between war, in which many human rights are held in abeyance, and peace, when the full range of rights is restored. And if Just War theory can blur the line between war and peace along a spectrum of rights rather than a spectrum of violence, it will have helped to strengthen the global humanitarian ethos that has emerged since 1945.
Notes
1. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 3.
2. See, for example, Deuteronomy 20:10–18 and Joshua 6:1–21.
3. See Jonathan Sumption, The Albigensian Crusade (New York: Faber and Faber, 2000).
4. See James Turner Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical Inquiry (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981); and James Turner Johnson, Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular Concepts, 1200–1740 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975).
5. The theory has undergone significant refinements over the past forty years, but for the original version see Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould, “Punctuated Equilibria: An Alternative to Phyletic Gradualism,” in Models in Paleobiology, ed. T. J. M. Schopf (San Francisco: Freeman Cooper, 1972), 82–115.
6. Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace (De Jure Belli ac Pacis), trans. Louise R. Loomis (New York: Walter J. Black, 1949).
7. See, for example, Glenn Stassen, Just Peacemaking (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1992); John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1998); and John Paul Lederach, The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
8. Quoted in Dan Caldwell, Vortex of Conflict: U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2011), 163.
9. For a good recent account, see Campbell Craig and Sergey Radchenko, The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2008), 65–73.
10. Martin J. Sherwin, A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975), 225.
11. Brian Orend, War and International Justice: A Kantian Perspective (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2002), 269–70. See also Brian Orend, The Morality of War (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 2006), 160–89.
12. See the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 771, entered into force March 23, 1976, Art. 4 (1).
13. See, inter alia, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, entered into force October 21, 1950, Art. 3 (1).
14. See Robert E. Williams Jr., “A More Perfect Peace: Jus Post Bellum and the Quest for Stable Peace,” in Ethics beyond War’s End, ed. Eric Patterson (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2012).
15. B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2nd ed. (New York: Praeger, 1974), 339.
16. Caldwell, Vortex of Conflict, 168.
17. Garry Wills, “The First Casualty,” New York Times (Book Review), September 14, 1975, 2.
18. See Orend, War and International Justice; Brian Orend, “Jus Post Bellum,” Journal of Social Philosophy 31, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 117–37; Brian Orend, “Justice after War,” Ethics and International Affairs 16 (2002): 43–56; and Davida E. Kellogg, “Jus Post Bellum: The Importance of War Crimes Trials,” Parameters 32 (2002): 87–98.
19. Ruti G. Teitel, Humanity’s Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 4.
20. Dan Caldwell and Robert E. Williams Jr., Seeking Security in an Insecure World, 2nd ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011), 195.