CHAPTER TWO
Strategizing in an Era of Conceptual Change
Security, Sanctioned Violence, and New Military Roles
MILITARY PROFESSIONALS EXERCISE the state’s monopoly on the “management of violence,”1 a role that remains important in the early twenty-first century. Yet violence is manifestly not the only expectation of contemporary military establishments and, in light of significant expansions in thinking about security and sovereignty violence, may no longer be the military’s primary role. There is a striking modern irony in the escalating transformation of institutions created to win armed conflict into those now equally responsible for attenuating, intervening in, or preventing it.
This chapter explores some of the conceptual shifts behind the changes in roles and missions of security sector actors. As notions of security have changed significantly over the past several decades, so have notions of just cause, and as missions have changed, what is required for success has also changed. The international community’s expectations of state militaries may now exceed their present capacity, and the Just War criteria of proportionality and likelihood of success require that security strategists align capabilities to expectations and discern realistic security ends against which they can apply feasible ways and available means. Those feasible ways and means will involve significant change in the security sector itself—including changes in structure, force development, focus, and ethos.
The international community has embraced new jus ad bellum norms regarding the use of force, including intervention in support of fundamental human rights. The “human security” paradigm means that security is no longer narrowly focused on the inviolability of the state but is instead also concerned with human welfare. These new jus ad bellum norms create jus in bello problems in that they frequently require combatants to carry out functions that are significantly different from those they performed in the past. To avoid causing harm both to themselves and to others, the manner in which military personnel carry out these new functions will also need to evolve.
WHAT IS DRIVING THE CONCEPTUAL CHANGE?
Security sector roles and missions are undergoing a dramatic transformation.2 The recent expansion in military roles is relatable to the issue of ends, and this calls attention to a worldwide evolution in contemporary thinking about security and public sector accountability. Since the early 1980s, scholars and practitioners have engaged in a fascinating series of debates about the meaning of security.3 The trajectory of this change has been away from earlier conceptions of national, regional, or international military security and toward the broad new conception of “human security.”4 These debates soon overlapped and eddied with scholarly conversations about related concepts such as development, democratic peace, and (later) Responsibility to Protect (R2P).5
At first, the new security conceptualizations were offered as analytical frameworks to identify the root causes of human suffering, but they were rapidly embraced by humanitarian activists who saw an opportunity to reframe security to support various advocacies. The enthusiastic embrace of the new ideas by the United Nations in the early 1990s and by policymakers in a number of states resulted in at least two rather different communities.6 While a number of G-77 and many non-aligned members worried that emphasis on human security would pose a threat to the norms of sovereignty and non-intervention, a number of nations, most notably Japan and Canada, and at least one grand alliance—the European Union—sought to make human security a guiding principle.7 Some scholars remained uncomfortable with the state’s embrace of human security, preferring to see the paradigm remain a conceptual tool for scholarly analysis.8
It is difficult to overstate the importance of the ongoing shift in thinking.9 Policymakers have agonized over conflicting mandates of protecting state interests and sovereignty on the one hand and fulfilling the growing global demand for a broad new vision of security—including issues of human security—on the other. Two noteworthy trends are evident. The first is a change in the international community’s thinking about the “referent object” of security. This is no longer exclusively taken to be the state. Rather, local communities—or even individuals—assume center stage as rights-bearing entities. Safeguards for individuals are now widely acknowledged as an inherent obligation of individual states and of the international community. The principle of Responsibility to Protect was unanimously affirmed by all UN member states in the Outcome Document of the United Nations High-Level Plenary Meeting (the 2005 World Summit). A few years earlier, the world community had unambiguously withdrawn almost any grounds for individual claims to impunity for atrocity crimes in war, with the Rome Statute (adopted in 1998) and the resulting creation of the International Criminal Court.10
The second noteworthy trend is a growing acceptance of a much broader definition of international peace and security than was prevalent before the mid-twentieth century so that the concepts no longer apply exclusively to the inviolability of national sovereignty and borders, maintenance of governing elites, or even protection of communities from external aggression.11 As defined by the influential International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), true security is human security, including “physical safety, … economic and social well-being, respect for [the] dignity and worth [of] human beings, and the protection of … human rights and fundamental freedoms [of individuals].”12 The human security debate has been advanced by the adoption of Responsibility to Protect, along with the Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court (ICC), which form a basis upon which the international community is obligated to respond to egregious affronts to human security. The bedrock value underlying Responsibility to Protect and the Rome Statute is a prioritization of the human being as the referent object of security. The obligation of the international community to protect human security within the borders of a state that is unwilling or incapable of doing so itself arguably leads a revised threshold of just cause for transgressing sovereign borders with coercive force.
In this new paradigm, “international peace and security” are not simply the absence of war and refugee flows or the security of state borders. The broadest definitions of security now encompass the ultimate objectives of universal freedom from want and fear, with a variety of necessary contributing ends.13 These include the following:
• Access to a decent standard of living for all members of a community (income security);
• Availability of sufficient food and clean water to adequately nourish all members of a community (food security);
• Access to adequate health care and freedom from the scourge of epidemic disease (health security);
• An environment that is not toxic and from which all members of the community receive equitable benefits (environmental security);
• Freedom from violence to persons, property, and dignity (personal security);
• Individual human rights of all members of the community respected and protected;
• Community norms and values that are safeguarded against rapid, destabilizing change;
• Governance that is accountable to all members of the community, including universal access to justice and fair dispute mediation.
A broad new definition of security leads naturally enough to a new categorization of threats; if the perception of “security” is increasingly broad, so is the list of factors or circumstances that threaten it.14 Not all of these threats can be successfully countered with military intervention. On the contrary, statements on R2P, including the ICISS report and the 2005 World Summit outcome document have purposely sought to encourage a broader range of responses to humanitarian crises, marking a distinct break with the earlier concept of humanitarian intervention. Nevertheless, even these statements acknowledge that some disasters will require the use of force. The broader notions of security in the new thinking are interrelated with expanding notions of accountability and responsibility (and human rights).
Significantly, under the new models, states themselves can threaten international peace and security without aggressive intent, simply by their inability to deliver competent governance. Some of this is little more than the elaboration of earlier themes in human history; for instance, an amplification of the concept of a social contract between rulers and the governed that gained currency in Europe’s Enlightenment or models of ethical conduct in war rooted in Augustine, Aquinas, and Grotius, now generally categorized under the rubric of Just War (jus ad bellum and jus in bello).15
Yet despite these continuities with the past, the most progressive contemporary views are unprecedented in scope—going well beyond the state-centric notions of earlier eras. The most progressive new thinking now posits a responsibility within the world community as a whole for safeguarding people everywhere from the depredations of nature, human strife, or even the ambitions of local leaders. These new responsibilities will not always involve the use of force, and some of the tenets of human security require restraint, but the expanded scope of security does potentially broaden the scope of just causes for which force may be used. Such expectations may still be more pious hope than reality, but they nonetheless represent a growing, novel vision of mutual global accountability.
While the worldwide understanding of security has shifted remarkably since the mid-twentieth century, the institutions responsible for delivering “security” under the old models have not. The state remains the key security actor on the international scene, and not all states are interested in accepting the responsibilities implied by the new security thinking. Even within sympathetic states, the security establishments are not necessarily amenable to the new ideas.16 Here, the largest, most expensive actors are still the military establishments, and some of these bear a remarkable resemblance to the eighteenth-century armies of King Frederick II of Prussia or King George III of Great Britain. This is true not only of their form and ethos but also of their articulated purpose. In many parts of the world their basic role is still to provide ruling elites with the ultimate capacity to apply irresistible lethal coercion against their enemies, including fellow citizens. To be sure, military roles and missions (along with military capabilities) have expanded significantly since the eighteenth century, but in the minds of many governing elites the newer roles are either irrelevant or little more than add-ons to the “sovereign control of the means of violence.” Where states are unable or unwilling to comply with the broad new visions of security within their borders, the international community may now recognize a responsibility to protect, but the “international community” has no army to enforce it.
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
“War makes states and states make war” is American sociologist Charles Tilly’s memorable aphorism, and state borders in modern Europe bear mute testimony to its applicability. Since the formation of the modern state, nation-states typically maintain war-making establishments. Until the middle of the twentieth century, only a few were reluctant to describe government oversight as the Ministry of War or War Department. The presumed key role of national military forces themselves was to engage in “war”—to project violence on behalf of the state when so ordered by duly constituted authorities. The main responsibility of the technocrats carrying out military orders was to do so efficiently and successfully.
It is worth noting that the move in the mid-twentieth century to retitle the government managerial and oversight agencies as the Department of Defense or Ministry of Defense fell in line with the ascendance of an aggressor-defender paradigm in Just War conceptualizations. This paradigm posited that all offensive wars were unjust, while all defensive wars were just. Just War thinking in recent years has challenged that view, suggesting that offensive use of military force is sometimes permissible (or even obligatory) in defense of grave threats to human security—for example, in the case of humanitarian disaster. Yet this thinking also rejects the notion that narrow state interests provide justification for offensive war.
The new thinking emphasizes legitimate authority, proportionality, and likelihood of success to justify lethal coercion for justifiable objectives.17 In the aggressor-defender paradigm, where all and only defensive wars were considered just, emphasis on proportionality, likelihood of success, and last resort was negligible. Likelihood of success and proportionality in wars of humanitarian intervention require protection of the noncombatants whose security is the war’s aim, as well as postbellum operations to maintain that security.
Some such roles and missions for military organizations are not entirely new. America’s small nineteenth-century regular army served, among many other roles, as a frontier constabulary, developer of national transportation infrastructure, facilitator of settlement, and accumulator of scientific data. European colonial military officials performed similar functions in nineteenth-century empires. In more recent times, military organizations around the world have served as labor pools for various needs of the state. Equipment acquired for military usage has been regularly redirected to other national priorities. The expertise of military planners has been diverted to humanitarian emergencies and other roles not directly related to the management of violence. But this does not mean that military professionals necessarily accede with equanimity to roles and missions outside the core of what they consider their legitimate expertise.18
By the 1950s, military planners were anticipating the possibility of massive conventional and nuclear war and preparing their militaries accordingly. Yet though general war was a contingency requiring readiness, it was also an almost unthinkable last resort. In fact, the most fundamental role for most of the military establishments engaged in the Cold War was to prevent war, not to conduct it. The lead “instrument” of state in this effort was diplomacy, with military activity simply an adjunct in a coordinated portfolio of options and elements of power. Here, the military’s principal role was to project credible deterrence through presence rather than resort to force. Its core competency was not so much “management of violence” as “preservation of stalemate” and to ensure that general war would be a bona fide last resort.
During the Cold War, peace support operations were at best tangential to the military roles and missions of the key contestants. By the early 1970s, peacekeeping had evolved largely into a niche role for countries whose political alignments were relatively inoffensive to the major Cold War powers. Non-aligned countries such as Finland, Sweden, and India were able to develop considerable expertise in this field. Other less developed countries found that commitment of troops to UN peacekeeping missions provided military training opportunities, served to keep military forces gainfully employed, and provided a lucrative source of revenue. Missions for peacekeeping forces were deliberately limited. The UN preferred the permissive environments of “Chapter VI” mandates with the typical role of separating cooperative former combatants. The Security Council was notably more reluctant to invoke “Chapter VII” for peace enforcement—authorizing coercion against recalcitrant armed actors. Peacekeeping could envision securing the activities of humanitarian organizations but did not typically imply any military responsibility for the needs of local civil society or any deep commitment to national reconstruction.
The aftermath of the Cold War brought new roles and missions into the mainstream of the larger military actors. The “new” kinds of conflicts were not really unique to the human experience but were now unconstrained by the pressures of Cold War competition. Therefore, they engaged the attention of the developed world in a new way. Somalia in the early 1990s offered both the United Nations and the United States a rude awakening to the disjunction between humanitarian impulses and likelihood of success.
By that time, military establishments still were “managing” (and applying) violence stalemates (as in Korea). But military interventions—for example, in Kosovo—were now legitimated by agreement between coalitions of partner states. Military personnel were expected to work harmoniously with coalition partners toward human security ends with an array of nonmilitary public and private sector actors, including international and nongovernmental organizations and civil societies.19 Success in these roles depended on productive relationships with coalition partners and local populations. The key role of military forces was now to project values rather than force. In addition to the management of violence, likelihood of success required the management of trust.20
DEFINING AND PRIORITIZING THE ENDS
Contemporary security sector agencies—particularly military establishments—are now being employed in a range of novel roles, whether or not the military members are developed with those roles in mind. Therefore this chapter is interested in the ends for which security sector agencies are suited—or could be suited if developed and managed in a visionary way. Or framed as a question: How may a society best use its most sophisticated and expensive public assets? That leads inexorably to further questions: What roles and missions are appropriate to security establishments, and how should these be trained, equipped, led, and dispatched to properly fulfill those roles and missions when required? If the rationales for just cause have expanded, and the types of roles and missions for military members have also changed, does it follow that military organizations must possess expanded competencies to satisfy the Just War criteria of likelihood of success and proportionality?
Leaving aside for a moment the concern of who within a governing elite exercises the prerogative to order the deployment of security sector agencies, a key issue is the coherence of the process for defining and prioritizing “security” ends—in other words, the ends against which “security” agencies conceivably could be used. Some of those ends would almost certainly include protection of those things that the governing elite and the larger society hold most dear, which returns to the definition of “security” itself. A clear definition of security is a critical first step in any rational effort to defend against the things that undermine or threaten it and should precede any conversation of the appropriate roles of security sector actors.21
Whether a society defines its “security” ends narrowly or broadly, its security sector will almost inevitably play some role in pursuing them. However, it is when the military or police engage outside the national borders that the broad new security thinking comes particularly into play. In a negative sense, security sector personnel conducting international operations are now subject to previously unknown levels of scrutiny, with growing pressure to uphold high standards of ethical conduct.22
SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING THE FORCE
Senior security sector officials, with their unique education and experience, offer management capacities rarely duplicated elsewhere in the public sector. This is particularly true of their ability to coordinate complex systems and their ability to perform threat and mission analysis. In other words, they should be able to take conflicting and ambiguous orders (or demands and expectations) and discern clear end states along with the subsidiary objectives required to arrive at those end states, factoring societal expectations and accommodating them in things like rules of engagement. They also should be uniquely qualified to coordinate the development and implementation of plans to attenuate, avoid, and overcome threats and obstacles. Senior security sector personnel—particularly senior military officers—are routinely expected to organize complex, divergent processes into a unified effort. It is rational to give such officials key leadership roles in humanitarian interventions of almost any variety. But there is still a question of whether even these officials are adequately prepared for the growing expectations.23
Military education emphasizes critical times and places at which concentrated effort can be directed to achieve decisive results—the tactician’s schwerpunkt, or main emphasis. The challenge here is to broaden their perspective to apply this expertise to decisive results involving diverse communities of actors in a culturally complex environment—to seek social schwerpunkts whose outcome is human well-being, harmonious human relations in general and productive civil-military relations in particular. Of particular value would be senior security sector officials able to visualize and pursue ends as broad as self-sufficient societies able to peacefully resolve internal differences with mutually advantageous linkages to the wider international community.24
Transformation of a security sector to succeed in the evolving new roles, even at the low end of existing expectations, may not be possible. At best, it is no simple prospect. Military establishments play roles sanctioned by long peculiar histories—often with substantial emotional investment by the host society. Security sectors themselves tend toward the traditional and conservative, reluctant to embrace social change and even more reluctant to lead it. Nor is there any real consensus among the global attentive public on the specifics of security sector renovation. Then, too, the changes to accommodate the new security thinking, both in expectations and in actual performance, have hardly been uniform and consistent. Military organizations themselves have yet to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that they are capable of meeting the evolving expectations. All that said, if security sector agencies—particularly military and civilian police—rise to the challenge, they will be obliged to consider changes both in organizational structure and in the development of individual members of the profession.
Structural change is arguably the most difficult challenge to articulate and achieve, largely because of the previously mentioned conservatism and the difficulty in anticipating the full range of challenges a security sector may be expected to address. It is unlikely that the capacity for warfighting—application and management of violence—will cease to be a core expectation. Modern security institutions are suited to this role, and security sectors in the developed countries are adept at producing military professionals capable of managing those institutions. It is the new roles and missions that seem to demand rethinking, whether structural or otherwise. The real issue is how to employ institutions originally designed to kill people and break things into organizations that attenuate violence by projecting values and managing trust.25
Some of the most innovative thinking on this topic has come from the European Union (EU), which commissioned a study in 2003 to explore the prospects for a human security approach to its European Security Strategy. The resulting study was overseen by London School of Economics scholar Mary Kaldor.26 Its recommendations were at once visionary and radical. The authors started with a fundamental assumption that the international community has an unavoidable obligation to intervene in situations of severe insecurity and that the primary goal of such intervention would be “cessation of violence in order to provide space for political solutions.” The immediate objectives would be to “protect people, calm violence, and establish a rule of law.” Kaldor’s study proposed a fifteen-thousand-person EU Human Security Response Force, fully a third of which would be comprised of “police officers, human rights monitors, humanitarian aid workers, civilian administrators and others.” It envisioned a core group of five thousand, maintained at high readiness with constant training for immediate intervention; the remaining ten thousand members would train together periodically for follow-on augmentation of the initial core group. The structural diversity was intended to produce a “new ethos combining the traditional military values like heroism, sacrifice and excellence with the civilian qualities of listening and enabling others.”27 In 2011, seven years after the publication of the study, there was little evidence that the EU intended to implement its recommendations or that any individual country was experimenting with such radical restructuring, but a significant restructuring vision had been introduced into the mainstream of ideas about new military roles and missions.28
The United States has endeavored to adapt its military to the new roles and missions since the turn of the century, although its military profession still exhibits substantial ambivalence about those roles. Some American analysts suspect that the global security environment of the early twenty-first century is little more than a “strategic pause” preceding the resumption of more traditional military competition between superpowers. All indications are that the United States intends to maintain substantial warfighting capability for the foreseeable future. It has tried to accommodate the “building trust” missions largely within its traditional structures. Still, there are at least four very public indications of some new thinking: first, the appearance of calls for new capabilities since about 2004 in policy documents such as the Quadrennial Defense Review; second, the publication of the U.S. Army and Marines’ new counter-insurgency (COIN) field manual;29 third, the U.S. Army creation of the Human Terrain System, providing army combat commanders with small teams of nonmilitary experts charged with connecting combat forces to local communities or societies; and fourth, a growing emphasis by about 2006 on developing much more foreign language capability and understanding of culture in the general purpose forces.30 In other words, the American approach currently places more emphasis on developing the people (human capacity) than changing the structure (structural capacity) to accommodate the new roles and missions.
Regardless of any structural change, it is unlikely that military organizations will be adequate for the new roles and missions without inculcating new understandings, values, and skills in military members. For the most part these are additions to—not substitutes for—existing capabilities, and the missing components almost all have to do with human relations. Military education in developed countries already pays attention to the human relations both of military leadership and of expected behavior of service members. What is novel is the additional attention to the relations between members of the military and the full range of human actors in the contemporary operational universe outside of the military organization itself. To adequately fulfill these new expectations, somewhat different sets of capabilities are required by military members of different rank and responsibility, of course—one developmental size cannot possibly fit the needs of all members. But it is possible to generalize at least four categories of required new knowledge and skills required for likelihood of success in mass atrocity response operations: ethical conduct, personality and social pathology, cross-cultural competence, and community living processes.
One of the most fundamental—and minimum—requirements in new capabilities is a basic awareness of emerging new global expectations of accountability to local communities and noncombatants. This is irrespective of the intensity of combat operations or the brevity of military intervention. The new expectations go well beyond traditional criteria of jus in bello. They include restraint not only in use of force and limitation of collateral damage but also expectations of succor for victims of trauma, sustainment of basic human needs (including physical safety), avoidance of activity that undermines the future health and safety of local populations, and safeguarding of cultural heritage. And there is more. The global attentive public expects military members not only to uphold standards of personal and organizational behavior but also to recognize and call attention to war crimes and crimes against humanity, wherever they occur and whoever the perpetrators may be.31
The gist of the new roles and missions is building trust and projecting values. This carries an assumption that actors of widely different backgrounds and perspectives will work effectively together toward common goals, generally with a military organization serving as the planning, logistic, and security glue that binds the whole. Given the potential diversities of agendas and cultures, the human relations aspects of these expectations can be daunting. Nor is it possible in advance to accurately anticipate all the possible permutations of personality and culture that will be encountered. If security sector personnel are deliberately and adequately prepared for the new roles, they require generalizable knowledge, skills, and attitudes that can be applied in almost any circumstance of complex human relations. This places a considerable challenge on military education and training programs. However, the expectations are not unreasonable and the task is not impossible.32
The requirement for military cross-cultural competence (often described in somewhat different words but meaning the same thing) has stimulated quite a bit of discussion among military practitioners and educators over the past decade. The heart of this issue is the expectation that security sector personnel successfully perform their duties in circumstances of significant cultural complexity that include differing organizational cultures and members of different nationalities and people groups. The challenge is rendered more complex by worldview differences often encountered within larger societies, reflecting differences of religious belief, class, generation, gender, and similar factors. A minimum set of capabilities required for this kind of competence would be:
• Perspective taking: an ability to suspend judgment and see reality through the “cultural filter” of another, along with a nuanced understanding of how one’s own values, assumptions, beliefs, and expectations may impede the ability to see the “other’s” reality.
• Cross-cultural communication: an ability to transmit and receive accurate messages across cultural boundaries, including a basic understanding of the role, use, and interpretation of nonverbal forms of communication.
• Relationship building: an ability to build productive working relationships in which all participants—regardless of culture or organizational affiliation—are motivated to work together effectively and harmoniously toward common objectives.
• Conflict management: an ability to analyze causes of interpersonal and interorganizational conflict and empowerment with an inventory of conceptual tools to resolve or attenuate the conflict, including skill in interest-based negotiations.
Beyond the particular skills of cross-cultural competence is a requirement for military personnel in the new missions to deal effectively with key cultural issues. Two examples are illustrative. One issue is social organization. At a minimum, this entails an ability to analyze how a local society conceives of its internal social connections, organizes collective activity, and allocates rights and responsibilities, while recognizing that these norms may have been changed or destroyed by conflict. At issue here is how collective decisions are made and disputes resolved. Within this framework, a military observer would want to know the local differences between coercive power, authority, prestige, and legitimacy and how to intersect, restore, or protect local governance and mediation. A second issue would be issues of livelihood, economic exchange, and the connection between the cultural environment and the natural environment, focusing on livelihood capacities that a community still has—so as not to engage in programming that dilutes or substitutes for it.
Here, the military observer would want to know how to encourage the continuation of a community’s agricultural and commercial rhythms and restore or protect traditional relations of production. Again, this is not to infer that all infantrymen should be social anthropologists and agricultural economists. Rather, it is to infer that an intervention force should contain some members with sufficient expertise that it can work with, not against, local social organization and local economic processes. Even better would be a “reach-back” capability in which military members can quickly access deep expertise, as required, to deal with operational problems.33
The foregoing discussion of competencies for the emerging new roles and missions will undoubtedly strike some members of professional military askance, as it represents a substantial deviation from tradition. American military leaders often talk about “legacy” weapons systems—expensive armaments still in the U.S. inventory but better suited to the requirements of earlier conflicts. However, much worse than legacy weapons are legacy ideas—prevalent models of human organization and human behavior no longer appropriate to the needs of the human family. These are particularly problematic when it comes to security. Given the priority and resources that societies devote to this requirement, legacy ideas are not merely unfortunate; they rob the future of its possibilities. Legacy ideas about “security” may be one of the most difficult issues faced by strategists.
At the same time, this discussion may also seem at odds with most thinking within the Just War tradition. Jus in bello norms, as they have been formulated, focus on making distinctions between military personnel and civilians and on minimizing harm to the latter. The focus has been on minimizing physical harm, based on the assumption that the military’s key role is in the projection of force. As this chapter argues, the military’s role has shifted so substantially that the projection of force is no longer the only—or perhaps even the central—function of the military. As its functions evolve, the military potentially causes other types of harm to the civilians it encounters. As such, the competencies that we discuss above are significant not only for the ultimate success of an operation but also in terms of minimizing harm resulting from these new functions.
Notes
1. Harold Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” American Journal of Sociology 46, no. 4 (1941): 455–68; Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 1957).
2. G. John Ikenberry and Anne-Marie Slaughter, Forging a World of Liberty under Law: U.S. National Security in the 21st Century: Final Report of the Princeton Project on National Security (Princeton: Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, 2006).
3. Jessica Tuchman Mathews, “Redefining Security,” Foreign Affairs 68, no. 2 (1989): 162–77; Stephen Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” International Studies Quarterly 35, no. 2 (1991): 211–39; David Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” Review of International Studies 23, no. 1 (1997): 5–26; Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (London: Lynne Rienner, 1998); J. Peter Burgess and Taylor Owen, eds., “What Is ‘Human Security’?,” special section of Security Dialogue 35, no. 3 (2004): 345–71. For a succinct but excellent overview of the evolution of this new thinking, see Annette Seegers, “The New Security in Democratic South Africa: A Cautionary Tale,” Conflict, Security & Development 10, no. 2 (2010): 263–85 (esp. 265–68).
4. S. Neil MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong, Human Security and the UN: A Critical History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006).
5. Oliver Richmond, “The Problem of Peace: Understanding the ‘Liberal Peace,’” Conflict, Security & Development 6, no. 3 (2006): 291–314.
6. High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change (New York: United Nations, 2004); United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), New Dimensions of Human Security, Human Development Report 1994 (New York: United Nations, 1994), http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1994/(accessed March 1, 2013).
7. See, for instance, P. H. Liotta and Taylor Owen, “Sense and Symbolism: Europe Takes on Human Security,” Parameters 36, no. 3 (2006): 85–102.
8. See, for instance, “Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World” (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1999), http://www.summit-americas.org/canada/humansecurity-english.htm (accessed March 1, 2013); Bert Edström, “Japan’s Foreign Policy and Human Security,” Japan Forum: The International Journal of Japanese Studies 15, no. 2 (2003): 209–25; Rialize Ferreira and Dan Henk, “‘Operationalizing’ Human Security in South Africa,” Armed Forces & Society OnlineFirst 35, no. 3 (2008): 501–25.
9. Tara McCormack, “Power and Agency in the Human Security Framework,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 20, no. 1 (2008): 113–28.
10. Human Security Report Project, Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
11. Carsten Stahn, “Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm,” American Journal of International Law 101, no. 1 (2007): 99–120; Stephen Marks and Nicholas Cooper, “The Responsibility to Protect: Watershed, or Old Wine in a New Bottle?” Jindal Global Law Review 2, no. 1 (2010): 86–130.
12. Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001). Of course, R2P as it relates to military intervention applies only in egregious cases of “freedom from fear,” not the “freedom from want” issues associated with human security.
13. Simon Chesterman has recorded the practical expansion in the use of the term “threat to international peace and security” by the United Nations Security Council in Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). See also Elizabeth Reid, “A Future, If One Is Still Alive: The Challenge of the HIV Epidemic,” in Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention, ed. Jonathan Moore (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 269–86.
14. High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, More Secure World.
15. See, for instance, Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace; Including the Law of Nature and of Nations (B. Boothroyd, 1901). The contemporary notion of “sovereignty as responsibility” cites an old concept. The oft-quoted eighteenth-century scholar Emerich de Vattel, while plainly affirming the autonomy of the sovereign state (particularly the moral equality of small and weak states to large and powerful ones), attached responsibilities to sovereignty: “If tyranny, becoming insupportable, obliges the nation to rise in their own defense,—every foreign power has a right to succour an oppressed people who implore their assistance.”
16. Ibid.; Ferreira and Henk, “‘Operationalizing’ Human Security in South Africa.”
17. Kimberly A. Hudson, Justice, Intervention and Force: Re-assessing Just War Theory in the 21st Century (Oxford: Routledge, 2009): 19–21.
18. Janine Davidson, “Giving Peacekeeping a Chance: The Modern Military’s Struggle over Peace Operations,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 15, no. 2 (2004): 168–84.
19. This coincided with “second generation” peacekeeping in the late 1980s and 1990s (and later, third-generation peacekeeping, which combined not only robust force but also wider mandates involving civilian protection and, in some settings, state-building beginning in the mid-1990s). The notion of integrated missions emerged from these experiments. Interview with Melissa T. Labonte, October 24, 2011. See also Margaret Karns and Karen Mingst, The United Nations in the Post–Cold War Era (Boulder: West-view Press, 2000); Michael Doyle, “War Making and Peace Making: The United Nations’ Post–Cold War Record,” in Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, ed. Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2001); Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel, “Cascading Generations of Peacekeeping: Across the Mogadishu Line to Kosovo and Timor,” in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement, ed. Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2001); Oliver Richmond, Maintaining Order, Making Peace (New York: Palgrave, 2002).
20. The author is indebted to Canadian military scholar Al Okros (Captain, Canadian Navy, retired) for this elaboration of expectations of security sectors. It is particularly his thinking that identified the “projection of values” and “management of trust” as contemporary responsibilities of military organizations.
21. Baldwin, “Concept of Security”; Buzan, Weaver, de Wilde, Security.
22. See, for example, Carol Allais, “Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Peacekeepers: The Psychosocial Context of Behaviour Change,” Scientia Militaria 39, no. 1 (2011): 1–15; Prince Zeid Ra’ad Al-Hussein, “A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,” United Nations A/59/710, http://cdu.unlb.org/Portals/0/Documents/KeyDoc5.pdf (accessed September 28, 2011).
23. Barak A. Salmoni, Jessica Hart, Renny McPherson, and Aidan Kirby Winn, “Growing Strategic Leaders for Future Conflict,” Parameters 40, no. 1 Spring 2010): 72.
24. Remi Hajjar, “A New Angle on the U.S. Military’s Emphasis on Developing Cross-Cultural Competence: Connecting In-Ranks’ Cultural Diversity to Cross-Cultural Competence,” Armed Forces & Society 36 (2010): 247.
25. Taylor Seybolt, Humanitarian Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
26. Ulrich Albrecht, Christine Chinkin, Kemal Dervis, Renata Dwan, Anthony Giddens, Nicole Gnesotto, Mary Kaldor, et al., A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, presented to EU Secretary-General Javier Solana, September 25, 2004.
27. Mary Kaldor, “A Force for Intervention: A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, and Beyond,” New York Times, 30 September 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/30/opinion/30iht-edkaldor_ed3_.html (accessed September 28, 2011). The EU’s motivation in commissioning the study, and the tenor of the recommendations, seemed to have had the earlier EU-sponsored intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo in mind. However, the timing of the study also suggested EU discomfort with the U.S. intervention in Iraq and a desire to distance European countries from the U.S.-led coalition and its more conventional military approach.
28. This view reflects the cosmopolitan security model envisioned by many EU elites and now under fire from some quarters. See reference to Ulrich Beck in Mary Hampton, “Living in a World of Dangers and Strangers: Changing EU and German Perception,” German Politics & Society 29, no. 3 (2011): 73–96.
29. U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 3–24.
30. All of these efforts have provoked controversy. Negative reactions in American academe include David Price, Weaponizing Anthropology: Social Science in Service of the Militarized State (Oakland, Calif.: AK Press, 2011); Roberto Gonzalez, American Counterinsurgency: Human Science and the Human Terrain (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).
31. Jared Tracy, “Ethical Challenges in Stability Operations,” Military Review 89, no. 1 (2009).
32. Ben Connable, “All Our Eggs in a Broken Basket: How the Human Terrain System Is Undermining Sustainable Military Cultural Competence,” Military Review 89, no. 2 (2009).
33. Allison Abbe and Stanley Halpin, “The Cultural Imperative for Professional Military Education and Leader Development,” Parameters 39, no. 4 (Winter 2009–10): 20–31; see also Counterinsurgency, Field Manual 3-24 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army and Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 2006).